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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
There is no dispute in this appeal that, as an essential element of the State's
charge against Edward Hochrein of felony violation of a no contact order, an essential
element of the State's burden of proof was that Mr. Hochrein had prior notice of the
underlying no contact order.

However, the State asks this Court to find that the

stipulation that a no contact order was "in effect" at the time of the alleged contact
subsumed an additional stipulation that Mr. Hochrein also had notice of the order. This
Reply Brief is necessary to clarify that, under governing law, the language in the
stipulation regarding the underlying order being "in effect," went to the duration of the no
contact order, which is a separate factual issue than whether Mr. Hochrein had notice of
it.

Because the stipulation never included any provision as to the separate issue of

notice, there was no evidentiary basis to support a jury finding of prior notice.
Accordingly, there was insufficient evidence to support Mr. Hochrein's conviction for
felony violation of a no contact order. For the same reason, the district court's omission
of this essential element of notice from the jury instructions in this case was not
harmless.
While Mr. Hochrein continues to assert that the district court erred when it
granted the State's motion in limine to preclude Mr. Hochrein from impeaching
Ms. Lewis with evidence of her prior conviction for felony possession of a financial
transaction card, he will rely on the arguments contained within his Appellant's Brief,
and will not reiterate those arguments herein.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Hochrein's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Was there insufficient evidence to support the State's charge of felony violation
of a no-contact order under I. C. § 18-920?

2.

Were the district court's jury instructions defining the elements of the offense of
violation of a no-contact order fatally deficient because these instructions omitted
the essential element requiring the State to prove that Mr. Hochrein had prior
notice of the no-contact order he was alleged to have violated?
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ARGUMENT
I.
There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support The State's Charge Of Felony Violation Of
A No-Contact Order Under I.C. § 1B-920
There is no dispute in this case that, as part of the State's charge of felony
violation of a no-contact order, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mr. Hochrein had prior notice of the underlying no-contact order.
Appellant's Brief, pp.12-20; Respondent's Brief, pp.7-B.)

(See

The State further does not

dispute that, outside of the factual stipulation entered into by the parties, there was no
evidence presented by the State that would establish this element. (Respondent's Brief,
pp.7-12.) Therefore, the core issue for this Court's resolution is whether the language
contained within the factual stipulation entered into in this case, that the underlying nocontact order was "in effect" at the time of the alleged contact, is a stipulation of fact
relating to whether Mr. Hochrein had notice of the order. Mr. Hochrein submits that, in
light of pertinent legal authority, it is not. Rather, the language of the parties stipulating
that the no-contact order was "in effect" relates to a separate legal requirement as part
of the State's burden of proof: that the duration of the no-contact had not expired as of
the time of the alleged contact.
The State acknowledges that the word "notice" is nowhere evident from the
stipulation entered into evidence in this case. (Respondent's Brief, p.9.) But the State
asks this Court to interpret the language in the parties' stipulation that the no contact
order was "in effect" to subsume a stipulation of notice. However, a review of the record
in this case and pertinent case law belies the State's argument.
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The language that the State seeks to invoke is related directly to the term in the
underlying no contact order in this case that governs the duration of the no-contact
order, not whether any notice of the order was given to Mr. Hochrein. State's Exhibit 4,
originally presented at the preliminary hearing, is the underlying no-contact order in this
case; and this order contains the following provision:
VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS A SEPARATE CRIME UNDER Idaho
Code 18-920 for which bail will be set by a judge; it is subject to a penalty
of up to one year in jail and up to a $1,000 fine. THIS ORDER CAN ONLY
BE MODIFIED BY A JUDGE AND WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL
11 :59 P.M. ON 3/14/11, OR UNTIL THIS CASE IS DISMISSED.
Consolidated Exhibits, p.6; Preliminary Hearing Exhibit 4 (emphasis added).
The above-referenced language subsumes the date of termination - and
therefore the duration, of the no-contact order as is required under I.C.R. 46.2 and
pertinent case law. And a review of the case law regarding criminal no-contact orders
further reflects that the language regarding the no-contact order being "in effect" in this
case refers to the fact that the order had not expired at the time of the alleged contact,
rather than referring to whether Mr. Hochrein had notice of the order's existence.
At the time that I.C.R. 46.2 was adopted in 2002 to govern the issuance of
criminal no-contact orders, the rule contained language that, "[t[he no contact order will
remain in effect until further order of the court." See State v. Castro, 145 Idaho 173,
175 (2008). This result ultimately proved undesirable. As was noted by the Court in
Castro:

Unless and until a party brought the matter back before the court, a no
contact order remained in effect. This enshrined perpetuity resulted in
confusion, false arrests, and lawsuits.
Id. (emphasis added).
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In response to the undesirable consequences of such an order without any
discernible date of termination, the Court modified I.C.R. 46.2 to now require that there
be a definite date of termination for criminal no-contact orders. Now, rather than being
in effect - or of a duration - that could extend into perpetuity, no-contacts orders now
must be in effect only for a stated period of time. See also State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho
769, 772 (2010). In order to be "in violation" of the order, which is a separate element
from having prior notice of the order, the State must then show that the order was not
yet expired - was in effect - at the time of the alleged contact. See ICJI 1282 (setting
forth that the defendant had contact with the named person "in violation of the order" as
a separate element than that the defendant had prior notice of the order).
Therefore, the language employed within the stipulation in this case was in direct
reference to a separate element under the State's burden of proof: i.e. that the
defendant had contact with the named person in violation of the court's order. Given
that every criminal no-contact order must contain a date of termination, after which the
order is no longer effective, the State was likewise required to prove that the order was
still in effect at the time of the alleged contact - meaning that the order had not
terminated by the time the alleged contact occurred.
At base, the State's argument confuses the issue of enforceability of the order
with when, and for how long, the order is "in effect." While a violation of a no-contact
order may only be enforced against the defendant, through arrest or the ultimate
imposition of criminal punishment, where prior notice has been had, the order itself goes
into effect once it is entered by the district court and the order remains in effect until the
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date of termination lapses.

See Cobler, 148 Idaho 772; Castro, 145 Idaho 175-176;

I.C. § 18-920(4).
II.

The District Court's JUry Instructions Defining The Elements Of The Offense Of
Violation Of A No-Contact Order Were Fatally Deficient Because These Instructions
Omitted The Essential Element Requiring The State To Prove That Mr. Hochrein Had
Prior Notice Of The No-Contact Order He Was Alleged To Have Violated
The State has further conceded that Mr. Hochrein has established the first two
prongs of the fundamental error test given the omission of the essential element of
notice from the elements instruction in this case in light of the Idaho Supreme Court
Opinion in State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576 (2011). (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-15.) The
sole argument raised by the State is that the instructional error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. However, the State's argument in this regard is reliant completely on
the State's prior, and erroneous, assertion that Mr. Hochrein's stipulation regarding the
duration of his no-contact order somehow subsumed the separate requirement of
notice.
For the reasons previously articulated herein, as well as those presented in the
Appellant's Brief in this case, the record demonstrates that Mr. Hochrein never
stipulated to having received prior notice of the order and that there was actually no
evidence presented by the State in this regard.
pp.22-26.)

See Point I supra; Appellant's Brief,

As such, the State's evidence could not be both overwhelming and

uncontested, as there was no evidence to support this element presented to the jury at
all.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Hochrein respectfully requests that this Court reverse his conviction for felony
violation of a no-contact order with prejudice because the State presented insufficient
evidence to sustain this conviction. In the alternative, Mr. Hochrein asks that this Court
reverse his judgment of conviction and sentence for felony violation of a no-contact
order and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 26 th day of April, 2012.

~/.~ar:
E.

SARAH
TOMPKINS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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